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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Carlos Esquivel appeals from the order of the district court summarily
dismissing his second amended petition for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Underlvina Criminal Proceedinqs
The factual background and course of the criminal proceedings are set
forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Esquivel, Docket No. 30424, 2004
Unpublished Opinion, No. 706, *I-2 (Idaho Ct. App. December 2, 2004) (referred
to herein as "Esquivel I"):
The victim in this case was a close friend of Esquivel's
stepdaughter. Between 1999 and June 2001, when the victim was
approximately eight and nine years old, Esquivel repeatedly
engaged in lewd conduct with the victim when she visited
Esquivel's home. The victim disclosed this conduct to a family
friend in 2002 and authorities were notified. As a result, Esquivel
was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under
the age of sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508, and one count of sexual abuse
of a minor under the age of sixteen, I.C. § 18-1506. Esquivel
denied all allegations, and the case proceeded to trial. Following
verdicts of guilty on ail charges, Esquivel filed a motion for acquittal,
alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdicts as to counts one and three--that Esquivel had
genital-to-genital contact with the victim. [footnote omitted] The
district court denied Esquivel's motion. Esquivel was sentenced to
concurrent unified terms of thirty years, with minimum periods of
confinement of fifteen years, for lewd conduct and a concurrent
unified term of fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement
of five years, for sexual abuse. Esquivel filed a Rule 35 motion
requesting reduction of his sentences, which was denied. Esquivel
appeals, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal, that his sentences are excessive, and that
the denial of his Rule 35 motion was in error.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Esquivel's motion for
acquittal, explaining:

The victim testified that she frequently spent the night at Esquivel's
home and that on these visits, she would sleep on her stomach in a
bed by herself. During the night, Esquivel would enter the room
without clothing, pull down the victim's pajamas, lay on top of her,
and "use his private to touch hers." The victim testified that
Esquivel rubbed his private on her bottom and indicated that by
"private," she meant Esquivel's penis and that by "bottom," she
meant in between her legs. The victim responded affirmatively
when the prosecutor asked her whether in between her legs also
was called "vagina." However, the victim further stated that
Esquivel placed his penis between her legs, that she did not feel his
penis touching her vaginal area, and that he would rub his penis
between her legs where her bottom was. On cross-examination,
Esquivel attempted to clarify whether the victim meant the "part she
poops with" or the "part she pees with" when testifying about her
bottom.
Esquivel asserts that, although the victim's testimony
supports the claim Esquivel had contact with the victim's anus, it
was unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Esquivel had contact
with the victim's genital area. We disagree. Genitalia is defined as
"the organs of the reproductive system; esp[ecially]: the external
genital organs."
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 946 (3d ed. 1993). Therefore, the victim's statement
that she did not feel Esquivel touch her vagina is not inconsistent
with genital-to-genital contact having occurred. Further, the jury
could have reasonably concluded that, when Esquivel rubbed his
penis in between the victim's legs, Esquivel's genitals came into
contact with the genitals of the victim. Finally, the jury could have
also reasonably concluded that the victim, who was eleven years
old at the time of trial, possessed an unsophisticated understanding
of human anatomy and was confused and embarrassed when
trying to clarify where Esquivel touched her. It was within the
province of the jury to decide what inferences were to be drawn
from the evidence and to resolve any conflicts in the testimony. We
conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's
finding that Esquivel had genital-to-genital contact with the victim.
Therefore, the district court did not error in denying Esquivel's
motion for judgment of acquittal.
(Esquivel I, pp.3-4.) The court of appeals affirmed Esquivel's concurrent unified
sentences of thirty years, with fifteen years fixed, and the trial court's order
denying Esquivel's motion for reduction of sentence. (Esquivel I, pp.4-5.)

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings
On July 13, 2005, Esquivel filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
alleging seventeen claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (if32689 R., pp.4lo), and a motion for appointment of counsel (if32689 R., pp.41-44). The district
court denied Esquivel's motion for appointment of counsel (if32689 R., pp.53-61),
concluding: "[Blased on the record, Esquivel's Petition and the law, the Court
finds that the Petition is frivolous on its face and is not a proceeding that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own
expense." (if32689 R., p.60 (internal citation and repeated text omitted).)
Esquivel subsequently filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief,
alleging six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) failing to request
an order for a polygraph examination (if32689 R., pp.73, 74); (2) failing to
"subpoena witnesses, introduce props, and abuse of discretion" (if32689 R.,
pp.73, 74-75, 79); (3) failing to ask CARES unit staff about the number of
interviews in sex abuse cases each had conducted and the use of stuffed
animals rather than anatomically correct dolls in the CARES video (if32689 R.,
pp.73, 75-80); (4) failing to object to the use of stuffed animals in the CARES
video; (5) failing to request an independent expert on the frequency of children's
false abuse claims (if32689 R., pp.73, 80); and (6) failing to request an
independent psychosexual evaluation (if32689 R., pp.73, 80-82). Esquivel also
alleged his appellate counsel was ineffective in not arguing abuse of discretion
on appeal.

(#32689 R., pp.74, 82.)

Esquivel filed a renewed motion for

appointment of counsel (if32689 R., pp.84-86), which the district court denied,

concluding, in light of the record of the criminal case, that Esquivel's amended
petition was frivolous and the court "does not find any claim of possible merit has
been alleged" (#32689 R., pp.93-100). The district court gave notice of its intent
to dismiss the amended petition (#32689 R., pp.108-117), and two-and-one-half
months later, the district court summarily dismissed Esquivel's petition (#32689
R., pp.132-142).
Esquivel appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion
for appointment of counsel because two of his arguments raised the possibility of
valid claims that entitled him to counsel. (#32689 R., pp.159-164) In State v.
Esauivel, Docket No. 32689, 2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 541 (Idaho Ct. App.
August 3, 2007) (referred to herein as "Esquivel [I"), the court of appeals affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The
court concluded the "district court did not err in denying appointment of counsel
to assist Esquivel in his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
based upon counsel's failure to request Esquivel undergo a polygraph
examination." (Esquivel II, pp.7-8.) The court did conclude, however, that the
district court erred in denying Esquivel's request for appointment of counsel to
assist him in pursuing his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his
claim that his attorney should have requested an independent psychosexual
evaluation. (Esquivel II, pp.7-8.) Specifically, the court found the district court
erred because Esquivel's application "allege[d] facts which raise the possibility of
a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim in regard to his psychosexual
evaluation." (Esquivel 11, p.8.) The court of appeals reasoned that Esquivel's

"application alleges facts indicating the possibility that his court-ordered
psychosexual evaluation was inadequately conducted" and that "[tlhe record
before this Court on appeal demonstrates that the results of Esquivel's
psychosexual evaluation were considered by the district court in making its
sentencing decision and was a factor contributing to the length of the sentence."
(Esquivel II, pp.6-7.)
As a result, the court of appeals reversed "the district court's summary
dismissal and denial of counsel as to this claim" and instructed the "district court
to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in pursuing the post-conviction claim that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to arrange an independent psychosexual
evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of the court-ordered evaluation."
(Esquivel 11, p.7.)
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Current Post-Conviction Proceedinqs
On remand, the district court appointed counsel, who filed an amended
post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel failed to properly advise Esquivel regarding his Fifth Amendment rights
in submitting to a psychosexual evaluation. (#35792 R., pp.25-27.) In response,
the state conceded "the defense attorney in this case did not advise [Esquivel] of
[his] Fifth Amendment Right to silence during the psychosexual examination."
(#35792 R., p.35.) The state asserted, however, that Esquivel's claim should be
dismissed because Esquivel failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice "as a
result of that failure by defense counsel." (#35792 R., p.35.)

On July 15, 2008, following briefing, the district court filed an Order
Conditionally Dismissing Second Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief.
(#35792 R., pp.66-77.) In that order the district court noted "Esquivel made no
incriminating statements to the psychosexual evaluator and, in fact, he continued
to deny responsibility, just as he had at trial" and that the "statements he made to
the examiner were consistent with those made at trial." (#35792 R., p.68.) The
district court further concluded "the Court learned nothing it did not already know"
in reviewing the psychosexual evaluation and, therefore, that Esquivel had not
shown a reasonable probability that, "but for his trial counsel's professional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different as required by
Strickland." (#35792 R., p.77.)

In his response to the order, Esquivel did not

directly address the district court's conditional dismissal, but rather "adopt[ed] all
prior pleadings and arguments advanced by the Petitioner in support of the
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. . . ." (#35792 R., p.79.)
On September 16, 2008, the district court dismissed Esquivel's second
amended petition. (#35792 R., pp.81-94.) The district court specifically stated
that although it mentioned the psychosexual evaluation at sentencing it did not
rely on the report. (#35792 R., p.92.) The trial court explained:
This Court determined Esquivel's sentence based on the
testimony he gave and the evidence produced at trial and not on
the psychosexual evaluation. The psychosexual evaluation did not
increase or reduce his sentence. Esquivel did not receive a
different sentence, either enhanced
reduced, based on his
refusal to cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation or because of
its contents. It was his failure to accept responsibilitv that
demonstrated rehabilitation was unlikely.

(#35792 R., p.92 (emphasis in original).) Accordingly, the district court dismissed
Esquivel's post-conviction petition. (#35792 R., p.93.)
Esquivel timely appealed. (#35792 R., p.95.)

ISSUES
Esquivel states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Does the law of the case doctrine prohibit the district court
from deciding in direct opposition to the Court of Appeals'
holding that counsel's deficient performance was not
prejudicial?

2.

In the first alternative, given the record, did the district court
err in determining that counsel's deficient performance was
not prejudicial?

3.

In the second alternative, should this case be analyzed, not
as an ineffective assistance of counsel case, but rather as a
case involving a denial of the state and federal constitutional
rights against compelled testimony, and under such analysis,
is reversal required because the state cannot show beyond a
reasonable doubt that denying Carlos his constitutional right
to remain silent was harmless error?

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Esquivel failed to establish that the district court committed reversible
error in summarily dismissing his claim for post-conviction relief?

2.

Esquivel claims the district court erred because his attorney's failure to
advise him prior to taking the psychosexual is not ineffective assistance of
counsel but an independent violation of his right to silence. Where
Esquivel failed to raise this claim below, should this Court decline to
consider the merits? Alternatively, even if Esquivel had raised this issue
below, has Esquivel failed to show that his right to remain silent was
violated or that the deprivation was not harmless?

ARGUMENT

1.
The District Court Properly Determined That Esquivel Failed To Meet His Burden
Of Establishing Preiudice
A.

Introduction
Esquivel contends the district court's determination that Esquivel was not

prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to advise him of his right to remain silent
during his psychological evaluation was in error. Esquivel makes two arguments
regarding this claim. First, Esquivel argues the ldaho Court of Appeals already
ruled on the issue and, therefore, under the law of the case doctrine, the district
court was precluded from concluding there was no prejudice. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.6-9.) Second, Esquivel argues the district court's determination that there
was no prejudice is clearly erroneous. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Both claims
fail.
Esquivel's argument that the law of the case doctrine applies fails because
the ldaho Court of Appeals did not articulate a principle or rule of law that
controls the present issue. Here, under the summaiy dismissal standard, it was
Esquivel's burden to show that his sentence would have been different if he
would have been advised of his rights prior to his completing the psychosexual
evaluation. The court of appeals did not previously address whether Esquivel
had met this burden.
Esquivel's argument that he established a claim of prejudice fails because
the district court's determination that Esquivel failed to meet his burden of
showing that his sentence would have been different had he been informed of his

rights regarding the psychosexual evaluation was correct.

Esquivel failed to

present evidence creating a material issue of fact on whether he would have
received a different sentence had he been advised of his rights prior to
completing the psychosexual evaluation. The district court explicitly stated in its
order summarily dismissing Esquivel's claim, that "[tlhe psychosexual evaluation
did not increase or reduce [Esquivel's] sentence." (#35792., p.92.) Accordingly,
Esquivel's claims of error are without merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 ldaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 ldaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 ldaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).
C.

The Law Of The Case Doctrine Is Not Applicable Where The ldaho Court
Of Appeals' Determination Was Made Pursuant To A Different Legal
Standard Applied To A Different Legal Issue
Esquivel first argues that the district court's determination that there was

no prejudice was in error because, he claims, the ldaho Court of Appeals already
ruled on the matter. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-9.) Esquivel claims that pursuant to
the "law of the case" doctrine, the district court was required to find prejudice
because of this Court's prior ruling that Esquivel raised "the possibility of a valid

claim." (Esquivel 11, p.5.) Esquivel's argument lacks factual and legal merit.
Esquivel mistakenly believes that by meeting the low burden for having counsel
appointed, he has also met the higher and different burden necessary to avoid
summarily dismissal.
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when an appellate court, "in
deciding a case presented, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law
necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case,
and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial
court and upon subsequent appeal." Tavlor v. Maile, --- ldaho ---, ---, 201 P.3d
1282, 1286 (2009)

(mSuitts v. First Sec. Bank of ldaho, N.A., 110 ldaho 15,

21, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1985)).
As a threshold matter, there is no "principle or rule of law" articulated by
the ldaho Court of Appeals that is contrary to the district court's ruling that
Esquivel had failed to meet his burden of showing, by competent evidence, that
his attorney's claimed deficiency resulted in a different sentence. The issue and
associated burden at play in the earlier proceeding was different than the issue
and associated burden presented by Esquivel's second amended petition.
The issue before the ldaho Court of Appeals in Esquivel II was whether
Esquivel was entitled to appointment of counsel. In order to prevail on this claim,
Equivel was required to raise the mere possibility of a valid claim: "If an applicant
alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should
appoint counsel in order to give the applicant an opportunity to work with counsel
and properly allege the necessary supporting facts." Charboneau v. State, 140

ldaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The result of meeting this standard

-- by alleging facts that raise the mere possibilify of a valid claim -- is that counsel
is appointed to help the petitioner meet the next, different standard required to be
met to continue prosecuting his claim

--

to submit verified facts within his

personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie case as to each essential element of the claim.

See Berg v.

State,

131 ldaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998) ("A claim for post-conviction relief

is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 if the applicant "has
not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element
of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.")
Furthermore, even where the applicant does submit competent evidence,
a district court may also grant summary dismissal where post-conviction
allegations are affirmatively disproved by the record. Cooper v. State, 96 ldaho
542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); Small v. State, 132 ldaho 327, 333-34,
971 P.2d 1151, 1157-58 (Ct. App. 1998).

Thus, before the district court, where the present assertion is ineffective
assistance of counsel and Esquivel's claim is that he was prejudiced by his
attorney's failure to advise him of his right to remain silent during the
psychosexual evaluation, Esquivel's burden is to demonstrate this prejudice by a
preponderance of evidence with competent evidence. Because it is possible to
assert facts that establish the possibilify of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel and still not establish that claim by preponderance of evidence and with
competent evidence, the district court's ruling is not in contradiction with the

ldaho Court of Appeals' opinion. As such the "law of the case" doctrine is not
applicable and Esquivel's claim fails.
D.

The District Court's Determination That Esauivel Did Not Meet His Burden
Of Submittina Facts Supportina His Claim Is Correct
Esquivel also contends the district court erred in determining that Esquivel

failed to establish a prima facie claim of prejudice from his counsel's claimed
deficient performance. ldaho Code Cj 19-4906(c) authorizes a district court to
summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition upon motion by a party if it appears
there is "no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." In order to survive summary dismissal, a postconviction petitioner must present evidence in support of his petition sufficient to
make "a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon which
the applicant bears the burden of proof." Bera v. State, 131 ldaho 517, 518, 960
P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
In determining whether an applicant's claim for post-conviction relief is
subject to summary dismissal, the court is not required to accept a petitioner's
factual allegations under three circumstances. First, the court is not required to
accept an applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence. Ferrier v. State, 135 ldaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); State v.
Roman, 125 ldaho 646, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). To the
contrary, it is always the applicant's burden to place in evidence the affidavits,
records (including all relevant transcripts) or other evidence supporting his postconviction claims. I.C. § 19-4903; Roman, 125 ldaho at 648,873 P.2d at 902.

Second, allegations need not be accepted where they are affirmatively
disproved by the record of the original criminal proceedings. Cooper v. State, 96
ldaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); Small v. State, 132 ldaho 327, 33334, 971 P.2d 1151, 1157-58 (Ct. App. 1998). Thus, a district court properly
dismisses a petition where at least one element the petitioner must establish is
"clearly disproved" by the record of the underlying criminal case. Stuart v. State,
118 ldaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Chouinard v. State, 127 ldaho
836, 839, 907 P.2d 813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995); Rerninqton v. State, 127 ldaho 443,
446-47,901 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Ct. App. 1995).
Finally, because the judge in a post-conviction proceeding "will be the trier
of fact in the event of an evidentiary proceeding, summary disposition is possible,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the
court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those
inferences." Haves v. State, 146 ldaho 353, -,

195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App.

2008).
Application of these legal principles to this case shows that Esquivel has
failed to show reversible error. As set forth above, the district court recognized
that at sentencing it had mentioned that it had read the psychosexual evaluation
in preparation for sentencing and that this was the factual basis that Esquivel
was relying on to establish prejudice. (#35792 R., pp.92-93.) The district court
explained that just because it reviewed the psychosexual report, "does not mean,
however, [that] those items [in the report] become factors in the sentence."
(#35792 R., p.92.) Indeed, the district court specifically stated that it "determined

Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave and the evidence produced
at trial and not on the psychological evaluation" (#35792 R., p.92 (emphasis
added)), and that the psychosexual told the Court "nothing it did not already
know" from the trial (#35792 R., p.77). Accordingly, the district court determined
that Esquivel was not prejudiced by anything in the psychosexual evaluation and
that his attorney's failure to inform him of his rights prior to completion of that
evaluation did not constitute facts establishing a reasonable probability that but
for counsel's deficient performance the results of the sentencing hearing would
have been different. (#35792 R., p.77.).
Esquivel has failed to show how this determination was in error. As
explained by the district court, the fact that the district court mentioned having
reviewed the psychosexual report is simply not a factual basis sufficient to meet
his burden of establishing prejudice. As explained by the district court, the mere
fact that a report is mentioned does not mean that the district court considered
the report in determining the sentence. (#35792 R., p.92.) Courts review many
documents, reports, and letters prior to sentencing and just because the court
states that it has reviewed these items does not necessarily mean that the
document report or letter influenced the final judgment of the court.
Consequently, Esquivel has failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima
facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel because he has failed to allege
facts that create an issue of fact on the question of prejudice. The fact that the
state cited the report and that the court mentioned that it had reviewed it in
preparation for the hearing does not create a genuine issue of material fact.

Additionally, the district court's ruling clearly explained that the court did
not consider the information in the psychosexual report in sentencing him: "This
Court determined Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave and the
evidence produced at trial and not on the psychological evaluation." (#35792 R.,
p.92.) Further, the court found that the psychosexual evaluation did not provide
the Court with any information "it did not already know from the trial." (#35792
R., p.77.) Consequently, to the extent any inference of prejudice could be made
from mention of the psychosexual evaluation by the district court or by the
prosecutor, the district court itself "clearly disproved" that claim.
Moreover, regardless of the district court judge's affirmative statement that
it did not consider the psychosexual evaluation, the district court judge would
also have been the judge at an evidentiary hearing. Consequently, the judge
was free to grant summary disposition "despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences to be drawn from the facts," in this case the fact that the psychosexual
evaluation was referenced by the court. See Haves, 146 Idaho at -,

195 P.3d

at 714. Thus, even if there were conflicting inferences that could be drawn from
the fact that trial court mentioned the psychosexual evaluation, it was entirely
proper for the district court, the court that actually imposed the sentence as well
as the court that would hold the evidentiary hearing, to resolve those inferences.
In sum, Esquivei's allegations that he was prejudiced by his attorney's
failure inform him of his rights prior to the psychosexual evaluation fail because
they do not show his sentence would have been any different. His claim that the
district court considered the psychosexual evaluation and that consideration

prejudiced him, was affirmatively disproved by the underlying criminal record and
was based on inferences properly rejected by the district court. Thus, the district
court properly dismissed his petition.
II.
Esauivel Failed To Preserve An Independent Constitutional lssue For Appeal
And, Even If He Had. That Araument Lacks Basis In Law
A.

Introduction
In addition to arguing the district court erred in summarily dismissing

Esquivel's petition, Esquivel also asserts, for the first time on appeal, that his
right to remain silent was violated: "[The denial must also be reversed because

. . . the error in denying Carlos [Esquivel] his right to remain silent must be
analyzed under the constitutional error standard . . . ." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.)
Esquivel argues that this was not an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but a
constitutional violation that merely required him to show a deprivation of that right
occurred, shifting the burden to the state to show harmless error. (Appellant's
Brief, p.10.) This Court should decline to consider the merits of Esquivel's claim
because, as a threshold matter, Esquivel never asserted his "right to remain
silent" was violated below. Additionally, even if Esquivel had raised this issue
below, Esquivel's allegations do not show his right to remain silent was violated
and, even if it were, the deprivation was harmless.
B.

Essuivel Failed To Raise A Right To Remain Silent Claim Below And,
Therefore. Failed To Preserve The lssue For Appeal
It is a long-standing rule in Idaho that an appellate court will not consider

issues, including constitutional issues, which are presented for the first time on

appeal. State v. Martin, 119 ldaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State
v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 109, 112 (1991); Small v. State, 132
ldaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Smith, 130 ldaho
450, 454, 942 P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. App. 1997). Failure to raise an issue in the
district court, thereby denying the trial court the opportunity to rule on the alleged
error, constitutes a waiver of those issues on appeal.
808 P.2d at 1324;

m,119 ldaho at 579,

m,121 ldaho at 181,824 P.2d at 112; Smith,130 ldaho at

454, 942 P.2d at 578.
A review of the record shows Esquivel never claimed that his "right to
silence" was violated. Esquivel's second amended petition specifically argued
"ineffective assistance of counsel" claiming "that his trial counsel's failure to
properly advise him regarding his Fifth Amendment Rights in submitting to a
psychosexual evaluation amounted to deficient performance." (#35792 R., p.26.)
There was no "right to silence" claim or any independent constitutional
violation asserted. Consequently, the district court never ruled on the matter and
there was no factual development of this claim at the district court level. Having
failed to even alert the district court to this claim, much less provide the district
court the opportunity to address the alleged claim, Esquivel failed to preserve his
claim of error for appellate review.
C.

Even If Esauivel Had Preserved A Separate Constitutional Claim. The
Claim Has No Basis In Law And To The Extent That It Has A Basis. The
Claimed Error Was Harmless
Even if Esquivel preserved this argument it is an argument without basis in

law. In support of his claim that his attorney's failure to advise him is not a

proper ineffective assistance of counsel claim but an independent constitutional
violation, Esquivel relies on State v. Darbin, 109 ldaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct.
App. 1985).

In

m,on direct appeal, the defendant asserted ineffective

assistance of counsel claiming his attorney deprived him of "the right to testify on
his own behalf."

Id. at

520, 708 P.2d at 925. The ldaho Court of Appeals

determined that a claim regarding a defendant's right to testify was not a proper
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because "the decision whether a
defendant should testify in his own behalf was personal to the defendant and
could not be made by his counsel as a matter of trial strategy."

Id.at 521, 708

P.2d at 926. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the claim was not
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and, as a result, should be evaluated
as an independent constitutional violation.
Here, however, there is no invasion on any decision that Esquivel alone
was required to make, m,whether he would testify at trial. It is uncontroverted
that Esquivel's claim is based on Estrada v. State, 143 ldaho 558, 149 P.3d 833
(2006).

Indeed, it was the only authority cited by Esquivel in his amended

second petition. (#35792 R. p.26.) Estrada, however, did not deal with an
individual's right to testify, but rather a defendant's right to be advised by counsel
prior to taking a psychosexual examination. In fact, the ldaho Supreme Court
was explicit that its ruling was "limited to the finding that a defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel regarding only the decision of whether to submit to a
psychosexual exam."

Id. at

562, 149 P.3d at 838.

Furthermore, the ldaho

Supreme Court made clear that an Estrada violation was properly considered an

ineffective assistance claim: "We affirm the district court's conclusion that
Estrada's attorney was deficient in failing to inform his client of this right." @. at
564, 149 P.3d at 839. Consequently, because Esquivel's "right to testify" was not
implicated and because the ldaho Supreme Court has evaluated this right only in
the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is no legal basis for
Esquivel's claim of error.
Even if Esquivel could establish a constitutional violation regarding his
psychosexual evaluation, thereby shifting the burden to the state to show
harmless error, that burden has been met. Error is not reversible unless it is
prejudicial. State v. Stoddard, 105 ldaho 169, 171, 667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App.
1983).

With limited exceptions, even constitutional error is not necessarily

prejudicial error.

Id. Thus, courts examine whether the alleged error complained

of is harmless.

See State v. Poland, 116 ldaho 34, 37, 773 P.2d 651, 654 (Ct.

App. 1989). An error is harmless if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the jury [or fact finder] would have reached the same
result absent the error. State v. Boman, 123 ldaho 947, 950-51, 854 P.2d 290,
293-94 (Ct. App. 1993). In sentencing, error is harmless "if it is plain from the
judge's reasoning that the result would not change or if it appears that any
different result would represent an abuse of the judge's discretion." @.
In this case, as set forth above, there was no prejudice and no harm
resulting from the claimed error. It is clear from the district court's statements
that its sentencing decision was not based on the psychosexual evaluation but
on other factors. The sentencing court "determined Esquivel's sentence based

on the testimony he gave and the evidence produced at trial and not on the
psychological evaluation." (#35792 R., p.92 (emphasis added).) Consequently,
regardless of any error associated with the psychosexual evaluation, the district
court would have imposed the same sentence. Because the district court would
have imposed the same sentence, there is no prejudice and any error claimed is
harmless. Consequently, there is no basis for reversal.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
orders dismissing Esquivel's second amended petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 28th day of May 2009.
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